A.2 Population Over Age 65
For people at or over age 65, we use the MCBS to estimate sex-and education-specific death rates for each single year of age between 65 and 95 (we topcode age at 95 in the MCBS data, due to a sparsity of single-year age observations above this point). These death rates directly imply survival curves for ages over 65. The 1931-41 birth cohort ranged between ages 51 and 68 over the MCBS sample period. Therefore, the very youngest piece of the MCBS sample represents our cohort of interest. With this calculation, we assume that the 2 1 2 4 2 7 3 0 3 3 3 6 3 9 4 2 4 5 4 8 5 1 5 4 5 7 6 0 6 3 6 6 6 9 7 2 7 5 7 8 8 1 8 4 8 7 9 0 9 3 Age
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College Graduates HS Dropouts Difference older cohorts in the MCBS have similar death rate differentials to the 1931-41 birth cohort, which has not yet revealed its true differential death rate patterns.
A.3 Results
The survival curves for women associated with these death rates and life tables are shown in Figure A-1. As discussed in the text, socioeconomic differences are not as large for women as they are for men.
B MCBS data B.1 Description of Data
The MCBS contains detailed data on health expenditures and especially on Medicare expenditures. MCBS respondents are linked to Medicare administrative data on claims.
25 From the claims data, the MCBS constructs total annual Medicare fee-for-service expenditure for each respondent, as well as the total annual payment made to a Medicare HMO on behalf of each respondent. 26 The sum of the two represents Medicare's total outlay on each individual. A detailed description of sample sizes in the MCBS appears in Table A-2. Medicare fee-for-service payments can be further broken down into Part A and B expenditures, by using data on the type of service rendered. MCBS breaks expenditures down 25 For details of the linking procedure, see Eppig and Chulis (1997) . 26 About ten to fifteen percent of elderly Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in Medicare HMOs. These are private HMOs that contract with Medicare to provide medical care in exchange for a flat, per capita fee. into the following service categories: inpatient hospital visits, outpatient hospital visits, institutional utilization stays, facility stays, home health utilization, hospice stays, medical provider visits, prescribed medicine, and dental visits. We take Part A expenditures to be Medicare fee-for-service expenditures for: facility visits, home health utilization, hospice visits, inpatient hospital visits, and institutional utilization. Part B expenditures are Medicare fee-for-service expenditures for: dental visits, medical provider fees, and outpatient hospital visits. We also decompose Medicare HMO payments into Part A and B components. Medicare pays a flat fee to private HMO's, who in turn provide hospital insurance as well as insurance for items that would normally be covered by Part B. Fortunately for us, Medicare explicitly decomposes its HMO payments into Part A and B components. To construct our decomposition, we use Medicare's explicit payment schedules, which are a matter of public record. Medicare's Part A and B payments to HMO's are determined each year as a function of the individual's age, sex, county of residence, coverage by employer-based insurance, coverage by Medicaid, and ESRD (end-stage renal disease) status. Since we have data from Medicare on the specific payment schedule from 1992 to 2002, and since the MCBS reports all the relevant characteristics for each individual, as well as monthly 27 data on whether an individual is enrolled in an HMO, we explicitly calculate the monthly Part A and Part B payments made by Medicare to HMO's for all respondents in HMO's. We were able to validate this procedure, because the 1995-1999 MCBS waves report the HMO premium actually paid by each respondent. We confirmed that our constructed premia matched the reported premia in every case, within rounding error (of one penny).
The geographic identifiers in the MCBS allow us to link it to several important databases discussed in the text. The first is a data set containing the GPCI used to deflate Medicare physician payments, and the hospital wage-price index used to deflate hospital payments. The physician GPCI's are used by Medicare to adjust expenditures for differences in area labor costs, practice expenses, and malpractice expenses. The wage-price indices are used to adjust hospital expenditures for differences in labor cost. Due to the exclusion of capital costs (which account for an average of 30% of hospital expenditures), the standard practice is to use (0.7)*(Wage Index)+(0.3) as an index of total hospital expenditures. We adopt this convention. Both indices were matched to beneficiaries in the MCBS sample by county and year. We deflate Part A expenditures using the hospital wage-price index and deflate Part B expenditures and HMO capitation payments by the GPCI deflators.
The second data set contains Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on per capita personal income at the county and state level, available by year. Since the BEA classifies counties according to the FIPS scheme, and the MCBS classifies them according to the SSA scheme, a crosswalk is used. The last is data from the 1990 Census on 1989 per capita income and area-wide educational attainment at the zip code, county, and state levels.
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The data contain the number of residents in each zip code, county, and state with a certain educational attainment, along with the total residents. They also contain per capita income data at each level of geographic aggregation. Using these three databases, we are able to augment the MCBS data so that it contains for each respondent: county-level price deflators for all components of Medicare; per capita personal income in state of residence for each year; per capita personal income in county of residence for each year; per capita income in zip code of residence during 1990; and educational attainment in the state, county, and zip code of residence during 1990.
B.2 Survival-Adjusted Benefits Profile
The impact of survival alone can be made clear if we adjust the Medicare benefits profile by survival. Multiplying each number in Table 1 by the relevant survival probability results in A-3 The table demonstrates that the advantage of the poorer groups in absolute terms is largely eroded by differential mortality, although the differences are still far below the corresponding gradients in taxes paid.
B.3 Calculating Lifetime Benefits
The lifetime benefits calculation begins with a full profile of benefits, from age 18 onwards. Table A-4 displays per capita Medicare benefits over the life cycle, computed from the MCBS. The per capita benefits figures for those under 65 are obtained using both the MCBS and the CPS. The MCBS is used to compute average benefits for individuals eligible for Medicare benefits. The 1992-99 CPS are used to compute, by age, sex, and education cell, the proportion of the population receiving Medicare benefits. The two numbers together represent per capita benefits in each age-sex-education group.
We cannot simply apply the lifetime survival profiles to the cross-sectional Part A benefits profiles in Table A -4. The benefits that will be received by the 1931-41 birth cohortour cohort of interest-will grow over time, past the levels that are currently observed in 28 These data are taken from GeoLytics (1996). Suppose Medicare benefits are assumed to grow at some rate X. We construct the lifetime path of benefits by first assuming that the real Part A benefit data from 1992-99 approximately represent the benefits the 1931-41 cohort will be receiving exactly at age 65. (We make the same assumption for benefits received under age 65.) We then suppose that benefits will be X% higher at age 66, an additional X% higher at age 67, and so forth. If B it represents the average observed benefit of group i at age t, we construct the age t benefit as B it * (1 + X 100 ) t−65 . 29 We explore the impact of real benefit growth that ranges from zero to four percent annually, since the latter figure has been the benefit growth rate that Medicare has experienced since its introduction.
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B.4 Calculating Family Benefits
To impute family benefits from the MCBS, we maintain the assumption from the HRS calculations that families are formed through marriage and dissolved only at the death of one spouse. Therefore, our task is to impute the Medicare benefits received by an individual as well as his current spouse, or his living ex-spouse.
31 When we alter our life-cycle sharing rule in Appendix D, we calculate rates of return based only on individual Medicare benefits. The analysis there serves as a check on the importance of the family benefits imputation also.
To impute the average family Medicare benefit for, say, X year-old college-educated males, we use the proportion (in the MCBS) of this population that has a living spouse or ex-spouse, along with the distribution of spousal education for 65 year-old college-educated males in the HRS. The average Medicare family benefit is then equal to the individual's benefit plus the average spousal benefit. The latter term is taken to be the probability of having a living spouse (or ex-spouse) within the age-sex-education cell, multiplied by the weighted average of Medicare benefits for X year-old females, where the weights are given by the distribution of spousal education observed for 65 year-old college-educated males in the HRS.
B.5 Accounting for Part B
The previous analysis accounts for the lifetime value of Part A. Unfortunately, we cannot produce similar estimates for Part B, because we do not have lifetime data on federal income tax payments for the HRS cohort. Since Part B of Medicare is funded out of general federal revenues, this limitation makes it impossible for us to estimate the exact rates of return 29 Specifically, B it is estimated within the following age intervals: 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, and 85+ . Within each interval, real benefits are assumed to be constant. We group the data within intervals to smooth out estimated benefits, because the data are too sparse to estimate benefits for every single age group reliably.
30 Data from the Health Care Financing Administration (http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/hstats98/blustat4.htm, downloaded on March 8, 2002) on total Medicare outlays and total Medicare enrollees, shows that per capita benefits grew four percent annually from 1966-2000. 31 Since virtually no elderly people get married for the first time, we do not consider the problem of benefits for potential spouses. $45,828 $50,998 $57,580 $64,375 $44,491 $44,304 $48,677 $49,588 1% $25,542 $28,098 $31,565 $35,082 $24,805 $24,390 $26,689 $27,096 2% $14,430 $15,674 $17,509 $19,339 $14,042 $13,602 $14,824 $14 on Medicare Part B. However, we do have enough data to show that, given the negative gradients in its benefit structure, Part B is likely to be progressive as well.
We cannot estimate internal rates of return, but we can produce bounds on the standard tax incidence calculation. The net present value of Medicare for group i is given by Equation 2.1. If this net present value represents a larger share of income for poorer groups, the program is progressive according to the standard tax incidence view of progressivity. We can take this approach to show that, at a minimum, Medicare is progressive, although we cannot quantify the exact extent of the progressivity. Our strategy is to show that net present value, in terms of (Lifetime Benefits -Lifetime Premia) -Lifetime Tax Payments, is falling with lifetime income. To do so, we will show that (Lifetime Benefits -Lifetime Premia) rises across education groups more slowly than lifetime income, and that Lifetime Tax Payments rise more rapidly than lifetime income across education groups.
First, we use the MCBS data to calculate directly the expected present value of Medicare Part B benefits, net of Part B premia paid by elderly beneficiaries.
32 Our estimates suggest that the expected present value of Part B benefits represents a larger share of lifetime income for high school dropouts than college graduates. Moreover, the progressivity of the federal tax system implies (and we will show empirically) that expected present income tax liabilities represent a smaller share of lifetime income for high school dropouts. These two results taken together imply that Part B is progressive under the tax incidence view of progressivity.
Data on Part B benefits are taken directly from the MCBS. Appendix B describes how we identify Part B expenditures. The MCBS also allows us to calculate the actual Part B premia paid by respondents, because it reports the number of months each respondent paid for Part B. We combine these data with Federal Register information on the monthly Part B premia charged, from 1991 to 1998 (the years covered by the 1992-99 MCBS surveys). We check these calculations against actual premia paid, which are reported in the 1995-99 MCBS. For every observation, our estimates are within rounding error (to the nearest penny) of the data reported in the MCBS. Table A -5 depicts what the family of the average individual in the given sex-education category can expect to receive from Medicare Part B benefits alone, net of actual premia. These figures assume a 4% rate of benefit growth (premia are assumed to grow at the same rate as benefits), and are discounted to the point of view of an 18 year-old. At a real interest rate of 3%, male college graduates can expect to receive approximately 34% more from Part B than high school dropouts, while female college graduates can expect to receive about 23% more. While these gradients are significant, they are not as large as the gradient in expected lifetime income across these groups.
To gain an appreciation for the gradient in expected lifetime income, we will make some conservative assumptions. First, suppose that mortality rates do not differ across education groups. In reality, differential mortality works to lower the relative lifetime income of the less educated. Ignoring this, we can look at annual gradients in lifetime income without adjusting for survival. Second, consider the gradient in family income for 1975, which exhibits the most compressed family income gradients over the entire period 1965-2001. 33 The family income gradients observed in 1975 provide a lower bound on the expected lifetime income gradients.
Using the Current Population Survey (CPS), we calculate average family income by education and sex, for 5-year age intervals. Figure A -2 depicts the results for the 1975 CPS. The figure shows that the family income ratio is uniformly above 1.5, even for this most compressed of years. This conservative 50% income gradient exceeds the difference in expected Medicare benefits, which is under 30%. Therefore, the expected net present value of benefits represents a larger share of income for poorer groups.
The calculations above show that Part B is progressive on the benefit side. As a result, it must be progressive as a whole, since it is funded by the progressive federal income tax system. The Congressional Budget Office reports that for the 1979-1997 period, the lowest quintile of taxpayers pay less than zero tax, while the highest quintile pay approximately 15% of their income (Congressional Budget Office, 2001) .
While the data are not as high-quality as the CBO data, the CPS (from 1980 through the present) itself contains imputations of federal tax liabilities, based on self-reported income data and other federal data sources from the IRS. 34 Using these data, we can estimate the gradient in taxes across education groups, rather than quintiles of the income distribution.
The top two panels of Figure A -3 depict the gradients for the year 2000, while the bottom two depict 1980. The left-hand panels display the data for males, while the right-hand ones show them for females. In every instance, the gradient in taxes paid is steeper than the gradient in income. There has been some expansion in the progressivity of the income tax system over the past 20 years, particularly for males. The figure illustrates empirically the legislated progressivity of the federal income tax system.
B.6 Trends in Progressivity
Table A-6 summarizes trends in progressivity over the life of our sample. From 1992 to 1997, benefits became more progressive for women-who represent the majority of aged Medicare beneficiaries-but there was a partial retrenchment thereafter. This is consistent with the findings of Lee et al. (1999) . We do not find a similar increase in progressivity for males. 1992 1999 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1992 1993 1994 Males Females
To explore the impact of these progressivity shifts on our calculations, we computefor individuals-the present value of Medicare Part A benefits, and the present value of Medicare Part B, using only the 1992 MCBS data, which exhibits the least progressive benefit structure. The results for Part A are depicted in Table A-7. Comparing Table A-7 to Table 2 , which is based on all available MCBS data, reveals an increase in progressivity for females over the 1990s, but little change for males: among females, college graduates receive a larger percentage premium in the 1992 data. This is consistent with our finding that the shift in benefits seemed to take place more for females than for males in our data. Of course, from a family perspective, progressivity would have grown for both sexes over the course of the 1990s. However, the size of the shift is quite small relative to the gradient in net dollar flows shown in Table 4 , and is certainly not enough to reverse our finding of progressivity for either sex.
Similar findings obtain for Part B, which also became more progressive over the 1990s, but which was still progressive under its 1992 benefit structure. Using the 1992 data, we find-for males-that college graduates received 38% more expected present value benefits than high school dropouts at a 3% real rate of interest. This is still less than our conservative estimate of a 50% higher lifetime income for this group. For females, the present-value advantage of college graduates was lower, and progressivity was higher from an individual perspective. $60,386 $61,997 $60,988 $75,893 $67,405 $73,829 $63,586 $66,873 1% $33,306 $34,030 $33,417 $41,422 $36,235 $39,187 $34,438 $35,273 2% $18,584 $18,901 $18,527 $22,885 $19,728 $21,065 $18,860 $18,828 3% $10,486 $10,619 $10,390 $12,793 $10,874 $11,465 $10,442 
C.1 Interpolation Across Time in the HRS Main File
We use five waves of the HRS data. Waves 1 and 2 record income data from 1991 and 1993, respectively. Wave 3 records it in 1995 or 1996, depending on when the interview was conducted. Wave 4 records it in 1997 or 1998, and Wave 5 records 1999 data. From these data, we exponentially interpolate missing years, but only if we have data on years prior to and following the missing year. In other words, we do not extrapolate any data.
C.2 Family Tax Liability
Since Medicare is financed by a payroll tax, the total expected tax liability ought to be calculated at the level of the family. Men tend to work more and pay more taxes than women, but these are taxes borne by the entire family, rather than just the individual man. The HRS data simplifies the task of computing annual taxes paid by couples, since a reasonable number of married couples in the HRS cohort are both present in the HRS data and the linked Social Security earnings data. For these people, we have complete data on the couple's income. The remaining respondents include the never married, widow(er)s, divorce(e)s, and married people whose spouse is simply not present in the linked earnings file. For these people, we must impute spousal earnings, according to an algorithm we describe below. Table A -8 provides a useful description of the data. There are 13,478 respondents in Wave 1 of the HRS. 3941 of these are not present in the linked Earnings History file. We drop these observations. As long as selection into the Earnings History file is random, this introduces no bias.
35 Another 6668 people (or 3334 couples) are present with their spouses or partners in the Earnings History file. For each of these people, we are able to calculate earnings for the couple. Of the remaining 2869 people, 264 were never married; as such, individual income is equal to family income, and we drop the 68 respondents for whom marital status is unknown. This leaves 2537 people for whom family income must be imputed. Consider first the 1051 married or partnered respondents in this group. We impute spousal earnings by looking at similar respondents and calculating the earnings of their spouses. Specifically, we compute the real average spousal earnings profile of all similarly aged and educated HRS respondents (of the same sex). The average earnings profile is then assigned to each respondent whose spouse is not present in the data. As discussed above, the 1029 divorced or separated respondents are treated as if they were married; average spousal earnings are imputed for them according to the same procedure. Even if the individual has been divorced more than once, our strategy will not be affected, as long as his spouses have been similarly educated.
This leaves only the 457 widowed respondents. The difficulty with these respondents is estimating the year of their spouse's death, which is not reported in the data. The best we can do is to make use of the HRS variable for "length of longest marriage." For those who are currently married in wave one of the HRS, we compute the year they would have 35 Haider and Solon (2000) show that, conditional on having a Social Security Number, selection into the SSA file is indeed random.
been married, assuming that their current marriage is their longest marriage. This yields the most recent year in which they could have been first married. We then compute the average year within the four education groups we are considering, racial category (white, black, or other), and age in 1991. This yields our estimate of year of marriage for widow(er)s. Using the variable for length of longest marriage, we then compute the year in which each widow's spouse would have died. This date is used to truncate the average real spousal earnings profile estimated above, and this finally yields the earnings that the deceased spouse would have contributed to the partnership. As a result of the data limitations we face, this is a highly imperfect strategy, but it is important to stress that it affects less than 5% of our sample. Even if we were to mismeasure income by 50% for these respondents, it would have less than a 3% impact on our estimates of average income.
C.3 Self-Employment Income
The HRS SSA file does not break apart taxable income into self-employment income and wage income, even though Medicare taxed these two types of income at different rates from 1966 to 1983. Today, the worker and firm each pays half the tax on wage earnings. However, through 1983, self-employed people paid at the tax rate faced by the worker alone, which amounts to half the total Medicare tax paid. Prior to this year, therefore, self-employed individuals faced a lower total tax rate than workers. During the years with a Medicare earnings cap, if a worker had earnings both from wage work and self-employment, her wage taxes were calculated first, and then her self-employment tax. For example, suppose a worker in 1967 had $6000 in wage income, and $4000 in self-employment income. Taxes would have been collected on all her wage income, but only the first $600 of her self-employment income. Her total tax would have been: (1.0%)*$6000+(0.5%)*$600=$63.
To decompose the HRS income measures into self-employment income and wage income, we use data from the 1966-83 Current Population Surveys (CPS). The CPS asks respondents about wage income, self-employment income, age, sex, educational attainment, and race. From the CPS, we estimate-for every survey year, 5-year age group, education group, sex, and race-the average proportion of total income subject to Medicare tax that was derived from self-employment. We restrict these calculations to CPS respondents that reported some income during the year. These proportions are then used to impute self-employment income and wage income for the 1966-83 period. In practice, these imputations had little effect on our estimated rates of return from Medicare. Even ignoring this issue-and treating all 1966-83 income as wage income-yields virtually the same rates of return. Nonetheless, for the sake of consistency, we estimate self-employment income. Table A-9 displays these estimated proportions for the age ranges occupied by the HRS cohort in 1966 and 1982. Selfemployment income is relatively for women and young men throughout these age ranges. It is, however, somewhat important for men over the age of 40, and particularly for high school graduates.
C.4 Taxes Across the Income Distribution
Mechanically, the tax gradient across the realized lifetime income distribution is steeper than across the education distribution, simply because taxes depend directly on actual lifetime We then compared average annual taxes across the education distribution, to taxes across the average annual earnings distribution. In this sample, 26% of people were high school dropouts, 33% high school graduates, 18% college attendees, and 23% college graduates. Therefore, we compared taxes for high school dropouts to taxes paid by the bottom 26% of the average annual income distribution; we compared high school graduates to people between the 26th and 59th percentile of the annual earnings distribution, and so on.
The results are depicted in figure A-4. As we hypothesized, the gradient in taxes paid is much steeper across the lifetime earnings distribution than across the education distribution. Average taxes paid differ by a factor of three between the top and bottom earnings groups, but they differ by less than a factor of two between the top and bottom education groups.
D CPS Data
To assess the sensitivity of our results to the assumption that family tax burdens are perfectly shared by a couple, we used CPS data to re-estimate rates of return under the assumption that taxes were perfectly divided between spouses. In this appendix, we discuss how the CPS data were processed and analyzed.
D.1 Matching Spouses
The most difficult part of using the CPS data is matching spouses. To aid in this task, the CPS provides a "household relationship" variable, which indicates whether the individual is a head of the family, or the spouse of the head. The CPS also identifies family units. We identify spouses as the individuals (of opposite sex) reporting that they are married, with spouse present, within a single family (or subfamily). Since the CPS defines a family around a single married couple, this procedure works in the vast majority of cases. However, there are a few problematic years : 1966, 1967, and 1972 . Apart from these years, there are a total of 276 observations that appear to be in families with more than 2 spouses (the entire CPS data set has more than 2 million observations). However, there are 9277 problematic observations in 1966, 4478 in 1967, and 43,474 in 1972 . The problem in 1972 appears to be duplicate family or subfamily identifiers: there are many instances of 4 and 6 spouses within a single family. For the other two years, the CPS identified households, but not subfamilies within households; the problematic observations thus could arise in extended families. Excluding these years from our calculations has little effect. All the results in the paper include them, but randomly match spouses within "families" as identified by the CPS.
D.2 Pre-1964 data
The HRS Earnings History file goes back to 1951, but the CPS only goes back to 1964. To make the average tax calculations comparable, we must account for the fact that the 1931-41 birth cohort did not have to pay Medicare taxes for some portion of its working life, prior to 1964. We simply construct data files for 1951-63 in which covered income is set to zero, but the one complication is how to weight observations in the pre-1964 years for the CPS. Essentially, we assume that the composition of the cohort remains fixed at its 1964 level. This ignores some differential mortality, but since the cohort is relatively young at this point of time, this bias ought not to be severe.
D.3 CPS Analysis
Partly as a result of data limitations, the earlier analysis takes the life-cycle view of perfect sharing of wealth, taxes, and Medicare benefits between spouses. Using different data, we now take the opposite view, that couples share wealth and taxes as little as possible. In particular, we now assume that unmarried people do not share with potential spouses, divorced people do not share with ex-spouses, and married couples share exactly half of their wealth and taxes. This strategy obviates the need to impute tax data for an unobserved ex-spouse or future spouse, and the need to impute family-level Medicare benefits from the MCBS. The reality of income-sharing within the family presumably lies somewhere between these two extremes of life-cycle sharing and this rather individualistic view.
By using data from the 1966-2000 Current Population Surveys (CPS), we are able to implement this analysis (Appendix D describes the processing of these data in more detail). Unlike the HRS, the CPS contains data on marital status at every point in time. Since we know with certainty whether or not individuals are married, we can apportion total family taxes into one half borne by the husband and another half borne by the wife. The two important drawbacks of the CPS are its use of self-reported rather than administrative wage data, 36 and the need to construct a synthetic 1931-41 birth cohort, 37 rather than the actual cohort present in the HRS.
From the 1966 through 2000 CPS data, 38 we select every household in which at least one person belongs to the HRS cohort. Within each household, we match each individual to his/her spouse if present and calculate the total Medicare payroll taxes paid by the couple. The tax burden of each couple is then split in half and assigned to each partner. If a spouse is absent but married (that is, not divorced, deceased, or separated), we impute spousal wage income within single-year age, sex, and education cells.
39 In the CPS, this affects just three to four percent of the total observations on spousal income; in comparison, the rate of imputation is about twenty percent in the HRS.
Table A-10 displays the resulting estimates of the per-person lifetime Medicare tax liability. It is not possible to compare these numbers directly with the family taxes paid in Table  3 , but it is possible to make some rough comparisons. Approximately, average family income should be about twice as high as individual income. Even if the data were perfect, this would not hold exactly, because not everyone is married, and spouses are not always identically educated. Nonetheless, this simple rule of thumb seems to work fairly well. Departures from the rule invariably seem to suggest underreporting of taxes in the CPS, relative to the HRS. Indeed, earnings profiles in the CPS are slightly lower than in the HRS administrative data. This could be the result of self-reporting bias, or of mistakes in the administrative data. Fortunately, this difference does not appear to affect progressivity.
This phenomenon also appears in the expected net present value of Medicare and the associated internal rates of return. the CPS tax data, the value of Medicare is higher for most groups, except perhaps for the least educated males. The values in this table tend to be a bit higher than those in Table 4 . Of course, we are measuring slightly different concepts in each table: this table reflects the  value per person, while Table 4 measured the value for the average family. The scale in both tables should be roughly similar, however, because Table A-11 is based on approximately half the tax payments and approximately half the benefits. The slightly higher values of Medicare are consistent with the lower earnings and tax payments in the CPS data. Notice, however, that the gradient across education groups remains unchanged. Medicare continues to be more valuable in absolute terms to less educated groups. Table A -12 displays the estimated internal rates of return based on the CPS data. These tend to be a few tenths of a percentage point higher overall than the HRS-based numbers in Table 5 , probably because earnings profiles in the CPS are slightly lower than in the HRS administrative data. This could be the result of self-reporting bias, or of mistakes in the administrative data. These data also tend to generate slightly larger spreads in the internal rates of return across education groups. Regardless, this difference does not affect the qualitative results of interest. We continue to find that the rate of return on Medicare falls for the most educated groups. Finally, it is interesting to note that the CPS figures are closer to our overlapping generations estimate of a 5.4% internal rate of return on Medicare. It is, of course, hard to draw conclusions from this, since our overlapping generations estimate should be seen as an unsophisticated benchmark.
E Aggregation
In this appendix, we first provide a more formal analysis of the difference between the education and zip code income measures. We then show that higher levels of aggregation result in a more positively sloped relationship between income and medical expenditures. Finally, we show that aggregate measures of education-just like aggregate measures of income-generate more positively sloped relationships between socioeconomic status and medical expenditures. This suggests the importance of aggregation, rather than education per se. 
E.1 Zip Code Income Quintiles
A regression context can provide a more formal sense of the relationship between zip code income and education measures. To facilitate the comparison between education groups and zip code income quintiles, we divide the MCBS population into five education groups: no high school, some high school, high school graduates, some college, and college graduates. Unfortunately, these are not equally weighted quintiles, but for some age groups, they are close.
Table A-13 depicts the distribution of education across age-and sex-specific groups in the MCBS. For all except the oldest age groups, the bottom two education groups are roughly equivalent to quintiles. The group of high school graduates, however, tends to be larger than a quintile, while the two college groups tend to be smaller than quintiles. In making comparisons across the distributions of education and zip code income quintile, therefore, it is important to bear in mind that the size of the high school graduates group is often larger than the size of the third quintile, while the sizes of the two college groups are often smaller than the top two quintiles.
Using the zip code income quintiles and the five education categories, we estimate the following regressions separately for age and sex-specific categories:
M careT otal it represents individual i s total Medicare expenditures (that is, Parts A and B) at time t. 40 ZipQuint it represents individual i s quintile in the zip code income distribution at time t, where zip code income is always based on the income of zip codes in the 1990 Census. The variables λ t and µ t represent time-specific fixed-effects.
Table A-14 reports the results of these regressions, which are identical to the curves 40 The differences between gradients are quite similar for the Parts A and B components as well. Figure 2 , except the regression estimates also remove a year-specific fixed-effect. The numbers in bold are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. As in the figure, the gradient across education groups is more steeply negative for women than for men, and more steeply negative for younger men than older men. However, considering that women account for 60% of the elderly Medicare population, and men between the ages of 65 and 74 account for another 20%, the bulk of the elderly Medicare population exhibits a significantly negative gradient across education groups. In contrast to the negative gradient across education groups, the gradient across zip codes is essentially flat among 65-74 year-old men and women over age 85.
To compare accurately the gradients for 65-84 year-old women, we estimated our regression across zip code income deciles. In the education distribution, the difference between the top decile (college graduates) and the bottom quintile (those with no high school) is about $1839 for 65-74 year-old women. In contrast, the difference between the top zip code decile and the bottom zip code quintile is $1162, less than two-thirds of the value across education groups. For 75-84 year-old women, the difference between the top education decile (college graduates) and the bottom quintile (those with no high school) is about $1515. The analogous difference across zip codes is just $360.
Finally, we should note that more accurate measurement of elderly income at the zip code level only seems to exacerbate the difference between zip code income quintile and education. Table A-15 compares gradients in zip code income quintile to quintiles in zip code elderly income. Specifically, we use the 1990 census to compute the proportion of elderly people in each zip code living in a household with more than $35,000 in annual income, and form quintiles based on this proportion. We chose the cut-off of $35,000 in order to form a distribution that divided into quintiles most evenly. The table demonstrates that, if anything, quintiles in elderly income result in an even more positively sloped relationship between Medicare expenditures and income. The one exception occurs for women over the age of 85, where the gradient is more negative for elderly income.
E.2 County Income Quintiles
Since the MCBS reports the county of residence for each respondent, we link the MCBS to Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on per capita income (described in Appendix B) at the county level for each year of the survey. We then split up the MCBS sample into county income quintiles, using the MCBS sample weights. In essence, we are ranking each year's MCBS respondents by county income, and then dividing up each yearly ranked sample into five quintiles of equal population weight. Figure A -5 reports the results. The left-hand panels depict the benefit gradient across county income quintiles, while the right-hand panels depict the gradient across education groups. The data points in the right-hand panel correspond to the figures reported in Table 1 , of the text. The gradient across county income quintiles is either flat or somewhat positive, even though in the same data, the least educated individuals receive the most per capita Medicare benefits. Even in the MCBS, therefore, benefits fail to vary negatively across local income groups. There is a fairly consistent positive trend in benefits across county income quintiles for males 75 and above, and for females over 85. Trends for men aged 65-74 and women aged 65-84 are flat, from the bottom to top quintiles. 
E.3 County Education Quintiles
Perhaps our results owe themselves to the distinction between education and income, rather than to geographic aggregation bias. To assess this, we look at gradients across aggregate measures of education. Our results suggest that these are similar to geographically aggregated measures of income; the aggregation seems the key feature, rather than the use of education itself. Data from the 1990 Census (described in Appendix B) allow us to compute the fraction of people within each county who had at least a college degree (the average proportion is about 20%) in 1989. 41 Since the MCBS contains data on county of residence, we can link these data to MCBS respondents. Based on the fraction of college graduates in 1990, we construct county education quintiles.
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The gradients across individual education groups and county education quintiles are shown in Figure A-6 . From the top to the bottom education quintile, there is often no change, or a decline of less than a few hundred dollars. In contrast, the gradient across individual-level education often exceeds $1000 from the bottom group to the top. Moreover, while the gradient across individual education groups is almost always flat or negative, there are several instances of benefits rising across county education quintile. Qualitatively, Figure A-6 looks similar to Figure A -5, which depicts the gradient across county income quintiles. In both figures, the individual-level education measures generate a more negative and more consistently negative slope than the aggregated measures.
E.4 Comparing Education and Income Measures
Our interpretation of the evidence rests on the finding that similar individuals spend more on medical care when they live in richer areas. A simple and direct test of this is to regress Medicare expenditures on individual's education and zip code income quintile, as in Table  A-16. Table A-16 shows the results of these regressions. Controlling for an individual's education, along with age, year, and sex, her zip code of residence has a significant effect on medical expenditures. People who live in richer zip codes incur higher Medicare expenditures than others. There is an annual difference of $319 between the top and bottom quintiles. Table A -17 shows that the timing of the relationship between migration and medical spending lends further support to our interpretation that migration has a causal effect on medical spending. The table shows the difference in medical spending between migrants to richer areas and migrants to poorer areas. At baseline, before migration, total medical spending is statistically indistinguishable for both groups, but the period after and two periods after migration, it is about $2000 to $3000 higher for the group that moved to a richer area. This is inconsistent with the reverse causality explanation, where health spending changes induce migration.
E.5 Longitudinal Analysis of Migrants
Finally, Table A -18 sheds some light on the characteristics of migrants. The table shows the results of a multinomial logit regression, with three outcomes: movement to a poorer (in per capita income terms) zip code, no movement, and movement to a richer zip code. The covariates are prior changes in Activities of Daily Living (ADL) limitations. The analysis reveals that people whose ADLs remained unchanged between time t-1 and t were less likely to move between t and t+1. It also shows that people whose ADLs rose were no more likely to move to richer or poorer areas than those whose ADLs fell. This casts further doubt on the possibility that migration is the outcome of a change in health and health spending, rather than the hypothesis that it causes changes in health spending. It also lends more support to the hypothesis that people in richer areas spend more simply because standards of care are higher there, and not necessarily because sick elderly people seek to move there.
